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“There’s no fire escape on a submarine”  
A folk wisdom 
 
 
The history of Russian-Belarusian integration is a strange history indeed. Throughout the 
whole decade ever since 1995, the two countries have engaged in a highly publicized 
series of diplomatic exchanges about their commitment to the Union state between each 
other, and ever-closer union it were to be in political, economic and military spheres. Yet 
despite all public declarations and the expanding bureaucratic machine that work on these 
declarations, there has been so little achieved in terms of real integration so far, that any 
student of integration would pose a legitimate question as to whether the purpose of these 
declarations was the integration or something else entirely. Especially puzzling is the fact 
that, despite the obvious disparity between these two countries, Belarus manages extract 
considerable concessions from its more powerful neighbour, giving little in return. For 
more than a decade, Belarus has sustained this strange process of integration with Russia 
on a slow burner and retreated each time a serious step towards integration was about to 
take place despite repeated threats of retaliation from the Kremlin. Yet Belarus has kept 
receiving considerable economic concessions from Russia in exchange for declarations of 
loyalty, that allowed the former to sustain its unreformed economy and increasingly 
authoritarian regime in relative stability.  In fact, the title of this paper captures the 
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essence of the relationship between these two countries so nicely, that we were tempted 
to leave at that.  
 
The rulers of Belarus and Russia keep engaging in a series of public appearances, 
together and separately, in which they try to outperform each other’s commitment to the 
Union state. Sometimes these exchanges end up in the joint declarations of friendship and 
cooperation, sometimes; to the contrary, they do in a very hostile manner. The 
culmination of the latter “war of words” became the nineteen-hour gas blockade (result of 
the disagreement over gas prices imposed on Belarus and gas tariffs for transporting gas 
through Belarus, for Russia) between Russia and Belarus in the winter of 2004, not unlike 
similarly brief gas-war between Russia and Ukraine in the beginning of 2006. Indeed, to 
a large extent the perturbations of this integration process revolve around gas and 
Belarusian dependence upon it. To quote President Lukashenko, two countries’ “relations 
are poisoned by gas” (REFRL, February 19, 2004), or, when the rulers are able to reach 
agreement, perhaps, they are lubricated by gas. Yet to reduce this case of strange 
integration to the geopolitics of energy would be a simplification too far. Bargaining over 
energy resources is enmeshed with other issues, such as political survival of Belarusian 
ruler and the Russian attempts to rebuild political influence in its “near abroad”.  This 
paper addresses the puzzle of the underlying interests and logic behind this strange 
integration process between a visibly disadvantaged Belarus and stronger Russia; the 
process that apparently makes Belarus better off than its Eastern neighbour. In this paper 
we describe the main stages of Belarusian-Russian integration during the last decade and 
analyze the interplay between the interests of political survival of Belarusian ruler and the 
interests of rebuilding influence in the near abroad by the Russian elites and how this 
interplay is manifested in a bilateral bargaining over energy resources and, crucially, in a 
series of public declarations and legal acts on integration between two countries. These 
published statements allow us to compare and evaluate changes poof preference profiles 
of the two leaders across time in order to understand the fluctuating dynamics of 
integration process. We will also be able to map the derived positions of these two rulers 
to the observed outcomes of the bargaining and see whether changes in preference 
profiles led to more cooperation.  
 We begin by describing the methodology we employ to derive preferences from texts, 
then we map these “words” to deeds in the main section devoted to the history of the 
integration process. Finally, with the help of a simple game theory we show how the 
regime of Alexander Lukashenko is able rather skilfully to exploit geopolitical interests 
of Russia at the expense of her economic interests, and how this is manifested in the 
strange nature of this integration process. 
 
 
WORDSCORING BELARUSIAN-RUSSIAN INTEGRATION 
 
Analysis of integration games between Belarus and Russia requires information on policy 
positions of key political actors. Principle ways to derive this information would be 
through surveys of the actors themselves or “experts” who observe them, an alternative 
being the analysis of the behaviour of political actors in strategic setting (Laver, Benoit, 
and Garry 2003).  
 
Here we propose to utilise the latest advances in context analysis methodology and 
extract policy positions of political actors from the texts they generate. In particular we 
attempt to infer the changes in policy positions from public statements made by Russian 
and Belarusian leaders. Constitutions of both countries provide for heads of state to make 
an annual address to the parliament and the nation at large, and discuss current issues of 
domestic and international policy (coincidentally, Article 84 in both Constitutions). 
Presidential addresses usually review the achievements of past year, discuss current 
problems, and map out plans for immediate future, not unlike State of the Union annual 
address that the U.S. President makes. In his 2000 address Lukashenko declared that it 
was meant to formulate tasks for the government for the next year, which should be 
viewed as mandatory for implementation at all levels of government. In Russia at the end 
of calendar year the government reports to Duma and faces gruelling questions on its 
progress in the implementation of tasks outlined by the president in his annual address 
(Naumov 2005). Annual addresses in Belarus and Russia are written documents with 
apparently little room for improvisation on the day. Overall annual presidential addresses 
in both Belarus and Russia are comprehensive documents that can be reasonably 
expected to reflect policy positions of country leadership on several policy dimensions, 
thus allowing us to avoid the ‘cheap talk’ and enabling us to derive meaningful inference. 
 
Extracting policy positions from parliamentary speeches and written documents usually 
requires the use of some laborious content analysis technique. However, latest 
methodological advancements significantly simplify our task. Here we will use 
computerised wordscoring technique outlined in (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). It has 
been recently utilised in the analysis of party manifestos (Benoit and Laver 2003; Laver, 
Benoit, and Garry 2003), legislative speeches (Benoit and Laver 2003; Laver and 
Giannetti 2005), and speeches at the Convention on the Future of Europe (Benoit et al. 
2005).  
 
The technique treats text as data; statistically comparing patterns of word frequencies in 
‘virgin’ texts to the patterns of word frequencies in ‘reference’ texts on a priori policy 
dimensions. First, relative frequencies of all the words in reference texts are calculated, 
which allows the calculation of a matrix of conditional probabilities for each word. This 
matrix has as its elements probabilities that when we are reading word w in front of us is 
our reference text r. On any a priori policy dimension with known or assumed positions 
of reference texts, this in turn allows the calculation of a vector of “word scores”, where, 
given that we are reading word w, each element of the vector is an estimated policy 
position of text r. Subsequently, combining word frequencies on virgin texts with the 
vector of word scores allows identification of the position of a virgin text on a priori 
policy dimension (for more details see Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003).  
 
When analysing the speeches of Belarusian and Russian presidents we assume that 
annual parliamentary addresses represent preferences of governing elites (for simplicity 
we shall view them as personified in the figures of Lukashenko and Putin respectively) of 
two countries on various policy dimensions. While undoubtedly both addresses are 
prepared by the teams of the ghost writers, the ultimate decision as to what include and 
what exclude from the address rests with the chief executives themselves. Essentially we 
place underlying preference profiles of Lukashenko and Putin at two ends of a priori 
dimension of analysis. Hence wordscoring the speeches of the presidents would enable us 
to observe the dynamics of change of their preference profiles relative to reference texts. 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the later period of integration games between Belarus 
and Russia. We easily downloaded all Putin’s annual addresses to the parliament (2000-
2005) from his official website4. Full set of annual addresses of Lukashenko was much 
more difficult to compile. Official website oddly lists public addresses of the president 
only from 2001, when he was first elected in 1994; it does however provide texts of 
2002-2005 annual addresses to the parliament5. Lukashenko’s 2000 and 2001 addresses 
had to be extensively googled and downloaded from elsewhere6. The choice of reference 
texts is primarily influenced by our interest in the integration dynamics summarised in 
the title of this paper. That is we would like to see why Belarus enjoys free gas in return 
for kisses. Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003) suggest the earliest dated texts as a reasonable 
choice of reference texts. Moreover, speeches by Lukashenko and Putin in 2000 contain 
similar number of words (5,387 and 5,149 respectively), thus prompting us to adopt them 
as reference texts. On an artificial metric we assume scores of +1.0 for Putin’s 2000 
speech and -1.0 for Lukashenko’s 2000 speech. 
 
We also supplement our evaluation of integration games with the analysis of the texts that 
are supposed to regulate the creation of the Union between Belarus and Russia. Hence we 
focused on 1999 Union treaty, and a 2002 draft of the Constitutional Act of the Union 
state, with the constitutions of Belarus and Russia taken as reference texts with scores -
1.0 and +1.0 respectively. The first two documents were downloaded from the website of 
the Union information agency7, and the constitutions from official websites of the 
presidents of respective states. Analysing these texts we assume that they are the results 
of a bargaining game between Belarus and Russia. We want to investigate whether it is 
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possible to place these bargaining outcomes on a dimension with extremities representing 
quintessentially Belarusian and Russian ideal points, epitomised in the constitutions of 
two countries. 
 
 
TALKING INTEGRATION VS. DOING INTEGRATION 
 
Alexander Lukashenko, the first and maybe the last president of Belarus, came to power 
in 1994 on an anti-corruption drive. His election replaced a parliamentary republic with a 
presidential republic. Subsequent constitutional changes allowed Lukashenko to 
consolidate personal power leaving Belarus in the words of US President George W. 
Bush and his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the “last dictatorship” in Europe, and 
an “outpost of tyranny”(Tisdall 2005). Early years of Lukashenko’s tenure in office were 
characterised by his popularisation of the idea of a revival of Soviet Union in the form of 
ever-closer cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States. When he did 
not find full appreciation of this idea from his partners in the CIS presidents club, 
Lukashenko focused on the idea of a scale-model of the USSR within the borders of 
Russia and Belarus.  
 
According to the official outline of integration process the foundation was laid with the 
signing on January 6, 1995 of the Customs Union, and subsequently, February 21, 1995 
of the Friendship and Cooperation agreement between Russia and Belarus. Formalisation 
of the integration rhetoric became apparent with the signing of a Community agreement 
between Russia and Belarus on April 4th, 1996. ‘Special’ relationship received further 
development one year later under the Union treaty of April 4th, 1997. Details of the Union 
and concrete integration steps were spelled out in the Declaration of further integration 
signed a year later on December 25th, 1998. However, again one year later, on December 
8th 1999, even further integration between the two states was promulgated with the 
singing of the Agreement of the creation of the Union State. (2005) These general policy 
agreements signed by the heads of state were accompanied by a plethora of policy area 
specific agreements signed by either heads of state or lower ranking officials8. (2005) 
 
There are several objective reasons why the leaders of Russia and Belarus repeatedly 
stated their preferences for the integration between two states. Official public rhetoric 
cites ethnic similarities and economic complementarities of these countries. However, 
this does not explain almost annual schedule of treaties coming out of the integration 
pipeline. Admittedly, union state building is not an easy process but that cannot be taken 
as an objective reason for re-iterative process described above. Moreover, we can only 
speculate about the real reasons behind it. It may be along the lines that Lukashenko and 
Yeltsin used the idea of the Commonwealth to cement their political position 
domestically by exploiting very popular nature of the process with the electorate still 
nostalgic of the Soviet times (Yeltsin was facing a very close election, and Lukashenko 
was changing the Constitution to boost his powers). Union treaty of 1997 can be seen as 
the first step to deliver on previous public promises. However by that time Yeltsin was 
looking more and more ill after a short-lived electioneering energy boost. On the other 
hand Lukashenko has just completed the restructuring of the political system that left him 
in sole control of the estate with ‘checks-and-balances’ persuaded into dissolution with 
the help of police truncheons. Further integration culminated in the Union state treaty of 
1999. That was supposed to be the crown of union state building, resolving all remaining 
questions and allowing for the final integration of two states into one USSR-type 
creation. Union State was envisaged to have single currency and budget, with single 
economic, customs, legal and defence space, common external borders and coordinated 
foreign policy. (1999) At that time Yeltsin left an impression of a person not in control of 
the country, while Lukashenko was probably bored in politically levelled out Belarus 
(Pourgourides 2004). Young ambitious leader viewed with interest the possibility of 
enlarging his playing field to a country where he was quite popular with the electorate. 
With the Union state treaty of 1999 Lukashenko put his foot in the door of Russian 
politics, or rather Union state politics.(Bovt and Grigorieva 2003; Golubev 2001)  
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However Yeltsin still had far more political intuition than allowed by pundits and 
subsequently chose Vladimir Putin as successor in the presidency of Russian Federation, 
thus frustrating Lukashenko’s possible grand designs. The relationship between Belarus 
and Russia changed significantly after Putin’s accession to the throne. The rulers of these 
two countries engaged in a series of public appearances trying to outperform each other 
in talking ‘integration’, yet no signs could be inferred of them actually doing 
‘integration’. Although integration rhetoric remained present in the media, it shifted to 
the periphery of political discourse in Russia. Additionally, the relationship between two 
presidents was never as cordial as during Yeltsin’s rule, and at times was very cool and 
accompanied by quite bellicose statements. The Union project was effectively put on the 
back burner until the summer of 2002 when integration rhetoric once again moved to the 
centre of political discourse. The sides entered the summer with Lukashenko positioning 
himself as an enthusiastic ‘chief integrationist’, thus obvious lack of progress in Union 
making would logically be due to less ‘enthusiastic’ position of Putin.  
 
To make up for a long period without personal contact Putin spends 9 hours with 
Lukashenko in St. Petersburg on June 11th, 2002. (Klaskovsky 2002) Immediate 
comments after the meeting were ordinary and did not draw attention of the media. 
However, two days later Putin, visiting a medical centre in Moscow, in passing noted that 
it was time to stop making the appearance of integration and proceed with genuine 
integration. He suggested that the form of integration had to be identified precisely 
depending on the depth of integration pursued, also outlining several alternatives: Soviet 
Union vs. EU type integration. Putin then publicly called for separation of “legal chaff 
from porridge” when drafting the Constitutional Act (CA), which was intended to 
formalise government and legal systems of the Union state. Russian president said that it 
was time to stop “chewing the gum of integration” and decide on the goals of the process, 
stating that “flies have to be separate from meatballs”. (KP 2003) Russian president 
effectively began the process of undermining Lukashenko’s image of leading 
integrationist.  
 
Next summit of two presidents was scheduled for August. Belarus was busy preparing for 
the summit, propping up the defences. On July 17th, Belarusian court questioned the 
legality of Russian ownership of “Zapad-Transnefteprodukt”, a company that nominally 
owns oil pipelines on the territory of Belarus, and belongs to Russian state company 
“Transnefteprodukt” that manages and owns export oil pipes. With this action Belarus 
directly threatened Russian strategic exports. (Voloshin 2002) In addition Belarusian 
government also restricted re-broadcasting of Russian television stations in Belarus, and 
cancelled re-broadcasting of two Russian radio stations (“Mayak” and 
“Yunost”).(Klaskovsky 2002) 
 
Before the summit Lukashenko declared publicly that Belarus will go in integration as far 
as Russian leadership is prepared to go. (KP 2003) Moscow summit itself was rather 
short, compared to the last meeting of two presidents, lasting just over two hours, and 
again might have proved nothing out of ordinary. However, at the press conference after 
the meeting, when Lukashenko stated that they discussed three alternatives of integration, 
but will not disclose them, Putin surprised the journalists and Belarusian president by 
publicly outlining these three approaches to integration process between two states. He 
proposed to create the Union state based on the results of a referendum, held in half a 
year, asking the population of two countries whether they supported integration of 
Belarusian regions into Russia based on Russian Constitution. Referendum would be 
followed by the elections of Union legislature and single president a year later. As other 
alternatives Putin named EU type integration, and a status quo. (Kolesnikov 2002) 
 
Lukashenko did not respond publicly until his plane touched down in Minsk. Then over 
the next several days Belarusian president publicly became the biggest proponent of 
sovereignty with some of the rhetoric making nationalist opposition jealous. He famously 
stated at a press conference at the opening of “Raubichi” sports complex near Minsk that 
“a bird cannot fly with one wing, at least for a long time. Hence Western direction is very 
important for us”.(Lukashenko 2002c)  
 
On September 7th, Lukashenko re-iterates his position that 1999 Union treaty is the best 
basis for Union state and instead of inventing new integration alternatives, Belarus and 
Russia should focus on implementing existing agreements.(Lukashenko 2002a) In an 
extended interview with BBC Belarusian president states his position clearer. He asserted 
that in the immediate future, even if somebody did not like it, the relationship with the 
West would significantly improve. Lukashenko was confident that Belarus had already 
received “certain signals” from the West, and improving the ties with the US and EU 
became “one of the priorities of Belarusian multi-vector foreign policy”.(Lukashenko 
2002b) Belarusian president subsequently announces his intentions to attend a NATO 
summit in Prague in November. That was by all means a sudden turn around, as Belarus 
has been isolated at the international arena since 1997, and previously viewed Russia as 
its priority in international relations with CIS countries realistically comprising full set of 
vectors of its multi-vector foreign policy.  
 
Belarusian economy heavily depends on gas deliveries with 70 per cent of its energy 
consumption made up of gas, and 90 per cent of electricity produced at gas-powered 
power stations.(Vinogradova 2004) These facts help to put into perspective the extent of 
Russia’s “appreciation” of Lukashenko’s rhetoric. It became apparent on November 1st, 
when Gasprom cut gas deliveries to Belarus by 50 per cent. Officially it was explained by 
Belarus’ failure to sign new gas delivery contract with higher price. (Vinogradova 2004) 
The situation escalated further when on November 6th; Lukashenko chaired an extended 
Cabinet meeting discussing energy security of the country. He called Gasprom’s actions 
“economic terrorism”, also reminding that Belarus had spent its fair share of time in the 
trenches of WWII.(Lukashenko 2002e)  
 
However, 2002 gas ‘blitzkrieg’ finished with the capitulation of Belarus, which was 
forced to accept Gasprom’s new contractual demands and pay outstanding debts on old 
contracts. At the same time Lukashenko’s possible overtures towards the West were 
rebuffed when he was denied visa to attend a NATO summit in Prague. Subsequently in 
November Lukashenko flew to see Putin in what is reminiscent of the “return of the 
prodigal son”. The homecoming was celebrated with an offer to supply gas to Belarus at 
Russian domestic prices. In return Belarus acceded to Gasprom’s demand to buy a stake 
in Beltransgas, state-owned company that owns and operates high-pressure gas pipelines 
used by Russia to export 20-25 per cent of its gas to Western Europe. Effectively Belarus 
just agreed to adhere to April 12th agreement that linked cheap gas to the creation of a 
joint venture to replace Beltransgas in which Gasprom would hold a parity share with 
Belarusian government. (Bykovski 2004)  
 
Russia also agreed to adhere to another agreement. In that case it was the 1999 Union 
Treaty stipulating drafting a Constitutional Act as the next stage in Union development. It 
also heralded the return to the process of legal consultations that were apparently 
suspended after the “legal chaff” comments earlier. Speakers of lower Houses of 
Parliaments were now tasked with heading the efforts in drafting the CA, with an official 
draft being unveiled in March 2003.  
 
The analysis of the document further supports the view that it tilts heavily to Belarusian 
side. Lukashenko always held that the basis for CA should be the 1999 Union Treaty, 
which preserved sovereignty of the states while also allowing for Belarusian president’s 
direct involvement and disproportionate (from the point of view of demography, 
economy, and international standing) influence in the Union’s political sphere. Belarusian 
side also always maintained the need for legal equality of two participant states, which 
would have resulted in quantum increase in Lukashenko’s political power and prestige. In 
his April 16th address to the Parliament Lukashenko admitted that the draft Constitutional 
Act satisfied Belarusian expectations in extending on the 1999 Union Treaty in 
preserving sovereignty and distinct economic systems of two countries.(Lukashenko 
2003) However, Russian political leadership never singed up to the ideas preached by 
Lukashenko and outlined in the draft Constitutional Act. This is evidenced in repeated 
delays of CA review by the presidents (a necessary step after drafting) and recurring 
amendments to apparently finalised drafts. As late as this year, now with the completely 
new version of CA the Russian side still cited some problems with the document that 
lingered from 2002. (Redichkina and Aptekar 2005)  
 
This suggests that in consultations in 2002 – early 2003 Belarusian side managed to force 
through a draft that was closer to their preferred outcome than to the outcome favoured 
by the Russian side. It is surprising, given that it was Lukashenko who flew in to seek 
Putin’s forgiveness. Hence we would expect the position of the Belarusian president in 
the negotiations to be relatively weak, subsequently influencing the outcome by pushing 
it closer to the Russian preferred result. That is unless Russia had no intention of 
following the Constitutional Act through from the beginning, or bargain over the CA 
being part of some bigger game played simultaneously.  
 
Utilising the methodology discussed in the previous section gives us a chance to test 
statistically propositions we just put forward. We would like to assess whether draft 
Constitutional Act was part of Russia’s appeasement policy of Lukashenko. As discussed 
above, estimated position of the Constitutional Act would reflect the outcome of the 
bargaining game between Russian and Belarusian leaders. The presidents themselves 
suggested the choice of reference texts for the Wordscore estimation. In his statement at 
the press conference after August 2002 summit Putin suggested that the Constitution of 
the Union state should be based on the Russian Constitution, while in his subsequent 
retorts Lukashenko vehemently and repeatedly denounced this idea defending the 
Constitution that he allegedly drafted himself in 1996. (Kolesnikov 2002; Lukashenko 
2002c) Thus we used Constitutions of Russia and Belarus as reference texts, and 
estimated the position of the draft CA relative to these two texts. If the Constitutional Act 
is closer to Belarusian Constitution then it is closer to the position of Lukashenko, and the 
opposite is true if the text is closer to the Russian Constitution.  
 
Below we present results of wordscoring the draft of the Constitutional Act in relation to 
the Constitutions on a -1 +1 metric. Metric standardisation procedure in Wordscore is 
designed for more than one virgin texts, hence for interpretative and comparative reasons 
we also included the texts of the constitutions as virgin texts in addition to the CA text.9 
Figure 1 presents transformed scores with 95 per cent confidence intervals (see Laver, 
Benoit and Garry (2003) for more details on scores standardisation and interpretation of 
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the results). We find some support for Lukashenko’s boastings in the Parliament about 
the outcome of the Constitutional Act bargain that we cited above. (Lukashenko 2003) 
However, statistical analysis of the text is a bit more modest, admittedly being modest 
compared to Lukashenko is not difficult as can be testified by any Belarus watcher 
familiar with his public appearances. Wordscoring the draft Constitutional Act places it 
on the “Belarusian side”, though just off the midpoint between two national constitutions 
with 95% confidence interval marginally overlapping the midpoint.  
 
 
 
<<Figure 1. about here>> 
 
 
 
Another test of our appeasement policy proposal would be to evaluate how close the 
Constitutional Act is to the 1999 Union treaty. Since Lukashenko repeatedly stated that 
the CA would ideally be an extended version of the Treaty, we would expect that the 
closer is the estimated position of the draft to estimated position of the Treaty, the closer 
is the outcome of negotiations to Belarusian president’s preferred outcome, in turn being 
a manifestation of presidents’ actual bargaining power. Based on Lukashenko’s (2003) 
comments we should expect the draft Constitutional Act to be very close to the 1999 
Union Treaty. Wordscore indeed confirms the statement of Belarusian president as 
illustrated in Figure 2. In fact transformed 95 per cent confidence intervals for CA and 
1999 Union Treaty overlap: CA (-0.097, 0.055) and 1999 Treaty (-0.165, -0.0001), with 
point estimates of -0.021 and -0.0826 respectively. Although their numerical values 
suggest that the 1999 Union Treaty is slightly more to the left (more “pro-Belarusian”) 
than the draft Constitutional Act, we cannot statistically distinguish between two texts.  
 
 
 
<<Figure 2. about here>> 
  
 
That is we cannot say with statistical confidence that the 1999 Union Treaty is different 
from the draft Constitutional Act. This result indicates that in the CA game Lukashenko 
came out a clear winner. Having just lost the first “gas war” Belarusian president staged 
an amazing come back by forcing through his preferred version of the Constitutional Act. 
However, contrasting the results in this section with subsequent developments that we 
discuss below indicates that Lukashenko was probably allowed to win this game, which 
was nested in a bigger game played simultaneously.  
 
The relationship between two countries and two leaders remained cool over the next year, 
which became apparent when Lukashenko abruptly cancelled his scheduled speech at the 
Parliamentary gathering of the Union state on May 21st, 2003. Commentators 
immediately called it a retaliatory measure to Putin’s failure to mention the Union project 
even once during his annual address to the Duma a week earlier. (Grigorieva and 
Danejko 2003) About the same time the Euro-Asian Economic Community (economic 
integration project initially consisting of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russian and Belarus) 
moved to the top of the Russia’s foreign policy agenda. (Grigorieva and Danejko 2003) 
Russia proceeded that year to court Ukraine, with Putin pushing through Kuchma’s 
election as the presiding chairman of the CIS. In what may appear to be a jealousy driven 
decision Lukashenko alone objected to the appointment, further cooling down the 
relationship between the leaders of two countries comprising the Union state. 
(Shishkunova 2003) 
 
The relationship between Union states reached its nadir, so far, in the winter of 2003-
2004. At that time Russia was once again applying ‘Gasprom diplomacy’. Just as the 
black ships of Commodore Perry opened up Japan in the 19th century, Gasprom becomes 
the prime tool of Russian diplomacy to “open” countries in its sphere of interest. With the 
conflict with Ukraine and Moldova still fresh in memory, earlier sallies included 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. (Shakhinoglu, Mazaeva, and Skorniakova 2005) 
 On February 17th, on the pretext that Belarus used up its quota of gas allocated according 
to previous contract and has not signed a new contract Gasprom reduces gas transit 
through Belarus by 30 per cent, which is the exact share of Belarusian gas consumption. 
Instead Gasprom suggests that Belarus signs new short-term contracts with independent 
gas suppliers that sell gas at a higher price. However, Belarus decides to take gas out of 
transit volume directed to Western Europe, immediately branded by Gasprom as theft. 
The next day Gasprom completely stops gas transit through Belarusian territory for 19 
hours. (Gubenko and Grigorieva 2004) 
 
Lukashenko reacted to the problems with gas deliveries at first very raucously. He 
recalled the ambassador from Moscow for consultations on February 19th. Belarusian 
President also called the whole affair of stopping gas deliveries in freezing temperatures 
an “act of terrorism”, also stating that the “relationship [between Russia and Belarus] is 
poisoned by gas.” (RFERL 2004) 
 
Gas market experts were quoted at the time as saying that without long-term damage to 
Gasprom’s reputation in its main export markets of Western Europe such an extreme 
measure as shutting down gas transit through Belarusian territory “can be used only 
once”. (Gubenko, Grigorieva, and Danejko 2004) This indicates that Lukashenko’s 
behaviour at the moment was perceived in Kremlin to be warranting the use of extreme 
measures. One possible explanation is that Belarusian president really believed that he 
somehow won the first “gas war” with the capitulation agreement by magic turning into 
the Constitutional Act. 
 
An indicator of the bitterness felt in Kremlin over Lukashenko’s behaviour is evident 
from an unusually blunt statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry: “Lukashenko 
has taken the course that leads to further deterioration of relationship with Russia. (…) 
President of Belarus bears sole responsibility for systematic mistakes in domestic and 
foreign policy that inhibit social and economic development of the country and that 
already resulted in international isolation of Belarus”. (Gubenko, Grigorieva, and 
Danejko 2004) 
 
Gasprom never relinquished its desire to take over Beltransgas following the gas conflict 
in 2002 and promises made at the time of Belarus’ capitulation. Russian gas monopoly 
expected to buy a stake in the company that would give some measure of control over 
export pipelines. However negotiations proceeded very slowly with both sides unable to 
agree on the price of Beltransgas. Lukashenko publicly declared that the company was 
worth 5 billion dollars, which is different from Russian evaluation of the whole company 
at 1 billion dollars and controlling stake at 580 million dollars (Vinogradova 2004). A 
member of Russian negotiating team was quoted in the press listing the choices open to 
Minsk: Belarus had to decide between expensive gas and preservation of national pride 
embodied in pipeline ownership; or cheap gas and a joint-stock company. (Grigorieva 
2004) Both choices were outside hitherto prevalent logic of the relationship between two 
countries within the Union state. The only preference that Minsk enjoyed was the ability 
to choose the lesser of two evils, and to choose very quickly. The slogan of the Russian 
side at negotiations became “the main thing is not to push it too far”. (Gubenko, 
Grigorieva, and Litovkin 2004) In turn Lukashenko used Belarusian cooperation with 
Russia in military sphere as the last remaining bargaining chip: Russia still operated 
several strategically important military installations in Belarus, in addition to air defence 
being an integral component of Russian air defence system. Lukashenko claimed that 
some of these services have never been fully compensated, summarizing the problem 
over the Russian transit in a one-liner to remember: “they fly, crawl, walk here, and all of 
it practically for free” (Gubenko, Grigorieva, and Litovkin 2004).  
 
During the second “gas war” Belarus managed to hold out for much longer than in the 
first Gasprom “blitzkrieg” campaign of 2002. Although this time around the pressure 
exerted on the Belarusian government was much higher, it preferred to buy gas from 
independent gas suppliers even on short-term contracts that could not adequately satisfy 
energy needs of the economy. Belarus agreed to sell a controlling stake in Beltransgas 
early in the conflict when a nineteen-hour break in gas supplies became a noticeable 
argument in the dialogue. In return Gasprom was more willing to discuss the exact terms 
of the deal, keeping the pressure on by refusing to sign gas delivery contracts until the 
deal over Beltransgas was finalised, yet at the same time supporting “independent” 
suppliers (some independent suppliers, like SIBUR, are owned by Gasprom). (Manenok 
2004) At the time, the obstacle has been an independent evaluation of Belarusian gas 
monopoly, with Russian side proposing to use Moscow office of Deloitte&Touche and 
Belarusian side insisting on the London office to avoid possible conflict of interest. 
(Bykovski 2004) Lukashenko was holding out until his second round of talks with 
Russian president on June 5th (two weeks after unsuccessful first summit), when 
presidents apparently agreed to proceed with integration for kisses exchange.(Naumova, 
Glanin, and Grivach 2004) As the result long-term gas contract was signed three days 
later in a compromise over price and transit tariffs. However, in a major concession 
Belarus surrendered its longstanding claim to “Zapad-Transnefteprodukt”, thus securing 
Russian oil exports. (Kahiani 2004)  
 
Nevertheless, Lukashenko succeeded in keeping his only remaining and most valuable 
bargaining chip off the agenda, again delaying the takeover of the company by Gasprom. 
Although Russian gas monopoly never publicly abandoned the idea of gaining control 
over Beltransgas, statements in the media were never again as bellicose as in the run up 
to the June 5th summit of the presidents. At the moment of writing negotiations over 
Beltransgas continue. Evaluation of the company remains the sole formal obstacle to 
Russia’s desire to take over gas transit network in Belarus. (Manenok 2005) What we 
witness now is that almost four years after signing an agreement to sell Beltransgas, 
negotiations over the deal are still in progress, while at the same time Belarus enjoys the 
lowest gas rate outside Russia. The presence of this puzzle in “pragmatic” world of 
Russian diplomacy indicates that the key to explaining past conflicts and their solutions 
lies primarily in political arena, with direct implications to integration processes between 
two countries.  
 
Above we have investigated the outcomes of a bargaining game over the Constitutional 
Act, and suggested that it should be viewed in the context of a bigger integration game, 
thus explaining Russian concessions to Lukashenko. The integration game will be 
analysed in the last section, however here we would like to evaluate whether preference 
profiles of political elites of two countries shifted over the years to coincide with the 
actions we have just described.  
 
We went ahead and again applied wordscoring methodology, however this time to all 
presidential addresses for Lukashenko and Putin for the period from 2000 to 2005 as 
described in the first section of our paper. The results are graphically presented on Figure 
3. As becomes clear from the figure, while we expected to see shifts in preference 
profiles of two presidents, we can discern significant movement only on behalf of 
Lukashenko. For each president it is not statistically possible to distinguish between 
speeches given in subsequent years, as their 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap. The 
only exception is Lukashenko’s 2002 speech with a significant jump away from the 
centre. Reading the 2002 text and comparing it to other annual addresses of Lukashenko, 
we could identify that it is different from previous and subsequent speeches in covering 
less dimensions of policy, but being more detailed on the dimensions that it covered. For 
example, international relations section of the speech contained 8 per cent of the words in 
2005 and 15 per cent in 2002. When the latter covered extensively only the relationship 
with Russia and CIS countries, the former discussed the state of relations with UN, EU, 
US, and Russia, in addition to the “war on terror”.(Lukashenko 2002d; Lukashenko 
2005) However it remains unknown what are the underlying factors behind unusual 
composition of the 2002 speech, and we are forced to leave it at that.  
 
 
 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
 
 
The first interesting thing about Figure 3 is that text, language-blind methodology that we 
applied here confidently differentiated the speeches of Lukashenko and Putin, proving 
again its value for social scientists. The fact that the speeches of two presidents are 
statistically different, in our interpretation means that they have statistically distinct 
preference profiles. This is a significant result in itself, as it statistically supports the view 
among some commentators that Russian elites cannot possibly consider Lukashenko as 
an acceptable figure for any position in Russian politics. (Bojchuk 2003) This may then 
be one answer to the question what went wrong with Lukashenko’s grand design of the 
late 1990s. Putin was chosen to succeed Yeltsin instead of Lukashenko because 
Belarusian president was less acceptable to Russian elites’ taste than Somoza was to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s.  
 
The position of preference profile of Russian elite remained constant with the exception 
of insignificant movement towards the centre in 2004. On the other hand, apart from the 
speech in 2002 the position of the preference profile of the Belarusian side has been 
constantly moving towards the centre, eventually moving across to the “Russian side” in 
2005. This suggests that although the gap in preference profile positions may explain why 
Lukashenko failed in his earlier attempt to move into Russian politics, the dynamics of 
his profile shifts are indicative. It appears that he unilaterally decided to move towards 
the centre, and later over to the Russian side. For now the Belarusian president is still not 
an acceptable choice to Russian elites. However, with the current rate of change and 
Russian elections set for 2008 Lukashenko may still find himself an active participant of 
the succession game, and part of the solution of Problem-2008.  
 
Another interesting observation from the analysis of the texts is that unsurprisingly 
Lukashenko talks… However, what is surprising is that over the years he talks more and 
more: while his 2000 address was “mere” 5,387 words, it expanded to 13,558 words by 
2005 (mean over 6 years 9163, standard deviation 3443). Putin on average says only 
5,573 words (st.dev. 462). Although Lukashenko still does not match the standard set by 
Fidel Castro’s September 26 1960 speech in the United Nations, which lasted 4 hours and 
29 minutes, after recent changes to the Constitution that removed term limits and the 
current rate of increase in wordiness, Lukashenko is set to approach the level of Nicholas 
Stadlen QC10 by the time he reaches the age of a respectable Chinese Politburo member. 
Such increasing verbosity should be a reason for concern on humanitarian grounds, since 
all speeches by the President are televised live on all Belarusian channels. 
 
 
ALL QUIET ON WESTERN FRONT 
 
At this point it is pertinent to ask why Kremlin relented and first allowed Minsk to drag 
on with the negotiations over the sale of Beltransgas, later effectively putting the whole 
issue on the back burner. Gasprom, at the same time, continued to supply gas at the 
lowest possible rate, thus subsidising ineffective Belarusian economy, while apparently 
receiving nothing in return.  
 
It is possible to speculate that Russian concessions at the June 5th summit were made 
because Russian leadership was entering an active stage of their campaign on the 
Ukrainian front and considered it not very convenient to keep one flank exposed. 
Alternatively, concessions could have been the price Lukashenko asked for playing a 
supporting role to Russian meddling in Ukrainian politics, with the first opportunity 
arising already in three weeks when Lukashenko accompanied Putin and Kuchma at the 
opening of USSR-nostalgic Friendship-2004 festival.(Gamova and Sologub 2004) 
Preparation for the Ukrainian campaign could be traced to Putin’s increased interest in 
courting Kuchma as early as 2003. (Grigorieva and Danejko 2003) Judging by the 
intensity of meetings between Russian and Ukrainian presidents by summer 2004 Russia 
was ready for active involvement.(Vorobjev 2004) Tacit electioneering by Putin began at 
the above-mentioned Friendship-2004 festival and formalised at the official summit with 
Kuchma on August 19th, when Yanukovich was officially introduced to Russian 
president. (Kozhushko 2004) However, Belarus enjoyed exceptional treatment in energy 
sphere even after the failed Putin’s Ukrainian campaign. Special relationship was 
reiterated recently amid the price hike for Ukraine when Belarus signing an agreement 
                                                
10 Nicholas Stadlen QC ended his "opening comments" after talking for 119 days, which proved the longest speech in British legal 
history. Bowers, Simon. 2005. QC completes longest speech in legal history. The Guardian, 25.05.  
with Gasprom on gas deliveries that kept the price unchanged from the previous year. 
(Manenok 2005) 
 
One possible explanation can be the change in preference profiles of Russian leadership. 
As it has been noted above, and will be elaborated in more detail below, Belarusian-
Russian bargaining over energy resources is enmeshed with other issues, such as political 
survival of Belarusian ruler and Russian attempts to rebuild political influence in its “near 
abroad”.  
 
Support for integration with Belarus in 1990s among Russian elites can be mainly 
explained by their desire to gain votes of the electorate still very nostalgic for the Soviet 
Union and politically rewarding any attempt to rebuild it. In similar vein, attempts to 
streamline the relations with Belarus during Putin’s first term were part of a broader drive 
at strengthening the state and rebuilding Russian influence in the countries of former 
USSR. On the other hand, the events of the late 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine 
seemed to reverse the pattern of Putin’s earlier dealings with Lukashenko and led to 
adoption of a more cautious policy. Despite repeated and visible Putin’s support for 
Yanukovich his failure to win the elections and the prospective for managed succession 
in other presidential regimes of “Near Abroad” in general threw Russian political elites in 
state of shock. In the words of Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev: “Ukraine’s 
orange revolution was Russia’s 9/11” (Krastev 2005).  
 
Events in neighbouring Ukraine led to frantic counter-revolutionary preparations and 
proliferation of various pro-Kremlin youth groups designed to offset possible 
revolutionary activity inside Russia. Ironically, they also made Lukashenko a very 
valuable partner. It may very well be that Putin was still willing to proceed with his 
policy of “separating legal chaff from porridge” in relations with Belarus, possibly 
combining it with launching a pro-Russian candidate not unlike Yanukovich that could be 
more predictable than Lukashenko. However, unexpected and drastic changes in Ukraine 
brought home the fact that further undermining Belarusian regime could bring not only 
concessions but also uncertainty and the possibility of pro-Western victory only this time 
in Belarus. During the meeting of two presidents in early December of 2005, Lukashenko 
cashed in his loyalty chips for Russian gas: 
 
“I would like to thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich, for the Government and the energy 
companies which fulfilled your instruction. We have almost worked out the contract on 
energy carriers supplies to Belarus following our accords… We are getting close to 
presidential elections in Belarus, and you know what’s going on around our country so 
I’d like to brief you on this too. You also promised to tell me something…”.(Kolesnikov 
2005)  
 
 
CHEAP GAS IN RETURN FOR KISSES 
 
The integrationist interplay between Russia and Belarus can be best illustrated with the 
help of very simple tools of game theory. For the ease of exposition and because of a 
non-technical nature of this edited volume, the following is rather informal.  There are 
two players in the game, Russia and Belarus. They engage in a strategic game with 
simultaneous moves. Russia has a choice of either supporting regime of Alexander 
Lukashenko, or withdrawing its support. Belarus has a choice of either integrating with 
Russia (real integration), or not (pretending to do so). Let’s elaborate on these strategies a 
little bit. Russia maximizes its geopolitical and economic interests in the region, so it 
supports Belarusian regime as long as this support advances her interests. If the regime of 
Alexander Lukashenko harms Russian interests, Russia withdraws her support. As we 
showed in the preceding section, despite its unpredictability and the lack of legitimacy 
(and, perhaps, because of it), the current Belarusian regime suits Russian geopolitical 
interests very well indeed. As long as Alexander Lukashenko is in office, Russia should 
not concern itself with the possibility of losing its Western ally. Belarus cannot join 
NATO or apply for E.U. membership as long as it remains a non-democracy. Due to its 
sore relations with the U.S. and the whole European Union that are hardly possible to 
improve under the current Belarusian leadership, Belarus also cannot be expected to turn 
towards the West by evicting Russian military bases from its territory or hosting 
American bases instead. In short, under current circumstances regime of Alexander 
Lukashenko satisfies Russian geopolitical interests and we should not expect withdrawal 
of her support, all things being equal.  
 
It is the second part of the title of this paper that concerns Russia, however. Indeed, 
Belarus enjoys many economic benefits from its privileged relationship with Russia that 
are hardly reciprocated. One has only to recall Russian subsidized oil and gas deliveries 
to Belarus, as well as its easy access to the Russian market to realize that Russia to a 
large extent does “pays rent” for Belarusian “economic miracle”. While a gas war was 
raging, this time between Russia and Ukraine in the beginning of 2006, with Russia 
demanding $230 for a cubic km of gas, and Ukraine agreeing to pay $80 (eventually 
agreeing to $95), Russia agreed to supply Belarus with gas for $47 (compare with $120 
for the Baltic states, $110 for ex-Soviet Caucasus states)11. Indeed, Belarusian economy 
has never been reformed and restructured but it stays afloat largely due to the generous 
energy prices that even allow Belarus to become the net exporter of energy products to 
the European markets (after reprocessing Russian oil in its oil refineries) (Pontis Policy 
Report, 2005). The possibility of investing and participating in Belarusian privatisation so 
far has been denied to the Russian companies (one has to recall the widely-publicized 
travails of Itera, Russian energy company, for example). The long awaited and much 
talked about introduction of a single currency is being postponed with a regularity that 
questions our beliefs whether the purpose of this exercise has ever been single monetary 
union in the first place. In short, while Belarusian regime serves the political interests of 
Russia on its Western borders (from the point of view of the Russian leadership), the 
former defects on economic cooperation, which in turn repeatedly provokes Russia to 
denounce its ally and to threaten it with sanctions that never materialize.  
 
If we turn to Belarusian strategies vis-à-vis Russia and if we simplify the choice of 
strategies as well here, we can see that the former has a choice of either continuing the 
                                                
11 Whether the price for this has been the long-awaited and much speculated sale of “Beltransgas”, Belarusian gas pipeline network, is 
not known at the time of writing this paper. One has to recall, however, that similar speculations preceded 2001 Belarusian 
Presidential elections. The sale, however, once elections had passed, did not materialize. See Talking Integration vs. Doing Integration 
section for background on the bargaining over “Beltransgas”. 
 
game of promises and “cheap talk” of integration, hosting annual summits and 
postponing the introduction of a single currency again and again, or, on the contrary, by 
integrating with Russia economically and politically either in the format of a Union state 
or some other form of integration. We described the history of the Union state formation 
in the preceding sections. The latter strategy would necessarily incur reforms of the state-
run economy in Belarus that is incompatible with the current form of Russian 
amalgamation of oligarchic and state-led capitalism. In turn, that would inevitably lead to 
a full-scale privatisation, in which Russian companies would be allowed to participate. 
The former would also entail a series of initial social and economic shocks familiar to all 
transitional countries, but which Belarus still faces to experience in the future and 
postpones with the help of Russia. As Belarus enters 2006, it exhibits all features of a 
full-blown personalist dictatorship. (Freedom House, 2005; on the features of these 
regimes, see Chehabi and Linz, 1998). The key feature of this type of regime is the 
centrality of the ruler rather than a clique or a ruling party, so that the incentive of ruler to 
survive in office overrides all policies, and regime survives as long as the ruler survives. 
In this kind of regime, ruler chooses policies that enhance his survival. To put simply, 
barring mistakes and uncertainty, policies that are compatible with ruler’s survival would 
be implemented, and those endangering survival would be discarded.  
 
In order to understand the cheap talk of integration, we should understand the incentives 
of Belarusian ruler. The regime is based on the explicit rejection of economic reforms 
and private initiative. It maintains a hardly reformed Soviet-type of socialism with the 
elements of private initiative, not unlike in the Czechoslovakia in the period of 
“normalization” in 1970s. While average income by the standards of CEE is hardly 
remarkable, the regime maintains relatively low visible level of unemployment and 
provides a minimum social safety net that allows it to keep the level of discontent rather 
low and to claim economic success of its model. Needless to say, the key to political 
survival in Belarus lies in the continuing existence of its chosen hyper-statist model of 
economy and control. In order to understand the strange game of promises between 
Belarusian and Russian regimes, we should analyze it in terms of political survival of 
Belarusian regime that chooses policies that enhance its survival, and rejects those that 
endanger it. As a real integration with Russia would necessarily entail a series of 
economic reforms that would dismantle the control of the state over economy and, should 
single currency be adopted, would lead to the loss of a monetary control for Belarusian 
regime, we should expect Belarusian leadership to prefer a continuation of a game of 
promises over integration with Russia, that is, the first part of the title in return for the 
second.  
 
With this in mind, we can easily see that the most preferred outcome for Russia is its 
continuing support of a Belarusian regime in return for economic (and political) 
integration, while for Belarus it is a continuing “cheap talk” of integration and continuing 
Russian support in return. Why Russia, as a stronger player, does not force Belarusian 
regime to choose real economic and political integration in return for its support? Surely, 
if Belarus cannot credibly threaten Russian with switching its allegiance to the West due 
to its pariah status, Russia must be able to advance its interests. The answer, odd as it 
may seem, is that Russia is in a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis Belarus, especially 
after the Orange revolution in Ukraine. In the eyes of the Russian elite, Belarus remains 
the only loyal ally on its Western borders after 2004. However little substance the 
integration talk over union state between Belarus and Russia has, and whatever economic 
costs Russia has to sustain in order to support Belarusian regime, the latter hosts an 
important military infrastructure necessary for Russian strategic defence, as well as fully 
participates in military and defence bilateral cooperation.  
 
There is a very high uncertainty whether any future possible Belarusian regime can be as 
pro-Russian as the current one. Indeed, even if the future ruler of Belarus commits to 
honour Russian strategic interests and to open Belarusian economy to Russian 
investments, by virtue of her democratic legitimacy any future Belarusian ruler will have 
options open towards the West as well, something that Alexander Lukashenko is denied, 
as he had the opportunity to see during his aborted foray into NATO summit in 2002.  
While the future leaders of Belarus could be as pro-Russian as the current one, and even 
be willing to integrate economy with Russia, for Russian elites it would entail a higher 
uncertainty over eventual outcomes than under the current regime. Alexander 
Lukashenko himself did all his best to become and remain the only pro-Russian politician 
in Belarus. It is no coincidence that Belarusian authorities are much more nervous when 
Belarusian democratic opposition attempts to establish contacts with Russian policy-
makers rather than anywhere in the West, as it threatens their monopolistic position. Most 
importantly, due to the high personalization and the increasing authoritarianism of 
Belarusian regime, there are hardly any independent political forces remain in Belarus to 
which Russia could switch its support. Indeed, as the leader of a personalist authoritarian 
regime, he is the only veto player in the country. After its failure to promote a pro-
Russian candidate in Ukraine, Russia would probably be very cautious to repeat its 
mistakes in Belarus.  
 
Belarusian regime is aware of Russian dilemma and can exploit it. It does not want to 
undergo serious integration, as it would threaten its survival. While Russian support is 
paramount for Alexander Lukashenko, real integration with Russia is tantamount to his 
political suicide. Barring credible commitments to guarantee his political afterlife in the 
Union State, Belarusian ruler will hardly be interested in a serious integration with 
Russia. In the preceding section we mentioned ambitious plans of the Belarusian ruler to 
venture into the Russian politics at the end of 1990s and the demise of such plans with 
Putin’s election. Nothing short of the top post would guarantee some kind of political 
continuation for Belarusian ruler.  
 
 
This interplay that we have been witnessing for more than a decade can be represented by 
a simple 2x2 table, which lists the players’ strategies and the outcomes. In each box, the 
left (first) entry denotes Belarusian payoff, and the right (second) Russian one. 1 stands 
for the most preferred outcome, 2 for second, and so forth, so that 4 is the worst possible 
outcome. For example, the top-left quarter contains (1, 3). It can be read as follows: 
Belarus considers continuation of “cheap talk” integration with Russia and its continuing 
support as the best possible outcome (1), and Russia considers supporting Belarusian 
ruler even though he does not intend to integrate as the third best outcome after 
supporting him in return for integration (1 for Russia) and attempting integrating without 
guaranteed support for Lukashenka (by applying “gas” pressure, for example. Belarusian 
regime prefers the continuation of “phoney” integration in return for Russian support, and 
it would rather continue its economic policies and not integrate with Russia even at the 
expense of the loss of Russian support. Regime is fully consolidated and by and large it 
can withstand challengers on its own. Should the situation arise in which regime would 
not be able to stand on its own without Russian support, it would prefer to receive this 
support and integrate whatever it would entail rather than having to integrate without 
guarantees of support. The last outcome is the worst, but also the least likely outcome.  
 For Russia, the best possible outcome is to support Belarus in exchange for economic 
integration; the second is to withdraw support for the current Belarusian regime and 
hence risk the uncertainty and the possibility of “losing” Belarus, and attempt to integrate 
with either threatened Lukashenka (without Russian back-up) or any other possible 
regime, the example of such strategy would be the winter “gas war” between Russian and 
Belarus; then to support and tolerate continuation of a series of promises without 
substance even without real integration, as Belarus remains the only loyal ally on its 
Western borders (3); and, finally, not to support at all and no integration,  that is, to leave 
Belarus to its own devices (4).  
 
The order of preferences can be seen as counterintuitive, as Russia should prefer 
integration with or without support, something that Belarusian opposition counts on. And 
it does prefers integration to all other strategies, but the caveat is that Lukashenka, 
however unreliable partner he is, is hooked to remain pro-Russian, and withdrawal of 
Russian support not only can endanger his survival prospects, but it would also endanger 
the integrationist prospects as well. In late 2005 the united opposition presidential 
candidate Alexander Milinkevich promised honouring all existing integrationist acts, 
whether in military or economic fields, and predictability and certainty in political and 
economic relations with Russia.(Mazaeva 2005) Should Milinkevich become the next 
ruler of Belarus, while he could indeed honour his pledges and introduce more 
predictability into relations between countries, by virtue of his democratic legitimacy, he 
would be also more flexible as regards relations with other countries. Not supporting the 
current regime incurs higher probability of emergence of a pro-Western Belarusian 
regime for Russia, the possibility Kremlin does not consider as favourable, and even if 
the new regime commits to integrate, it could still renege and turn to the West, something 
that the current regime is not in a position to achieve. This is why, all things being equal, 
Kremlin keeps supporting the Belarusian ruler all these years and in all likelihood will 
keep doing that, something that many international organizations that encourage Russian 
to assist democratization of Belarus fail to understand. 
 
As typically with these kinds of games, we should see for any dominant strategy. A 
dominant strategy is the one when a player has one strategy that outperforms all others no 
matter what the other player does. If we look at the table, we could immediately see that 
Belarusian regime has such a strategy: continue with “words”, no matter what Russia 
does. Real integration entails economic reforms that could mortally threaten ruler’s 
survival, so it is better not to reform even without Russian support than to reform with or 
without support. Russian side engages in the similar thinking exercise and realizes that no 
matter what it does, Belarus has a dominant strategy. So it has to choose between 
supporting and withdrawal of support and as we established before, Russia chooses to 
“pay rent in exchange for love”.  
 
The fact that we design this game as simultaneous simplifies things a lot. Indeed, more 
plausible is to construct bargaining game with sequential moves, where Belarus first 
promises to integrate with Russia, Russia supports it, then Belarus promises to integrate 
later, and so on and so forth. But we believe that the essence of the relationship between 
these two countries can be captured by this elemental model just fine.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The strange case of the Belarusian-Russian integration cannot be grasped fully unless we 
take non-economic reasons into consideration. We utilized the tools of context analysis 
methodology, simple game theory and analytical narrative in order to disentangle the 
preferences profiles of Russian and Belarusian elites and their bargaining over 
integration. Indeed, while the bargaining over gas became the most prominent and visible 
accompaniment to this integration, the dynamics of this bargaining and the outcomes 
thereof could only be understood if we turn to the preferences of both actors: the 
preferences of the Russian elite to rebuild its geopolitical influence in its “Near Abroad” 
and the role of Belarus thereof, and the political survival policies of Belarusian ruler and 
his inability and unwillingness to commit. Propping up unreformed Belarusian economy 
in exchange for the vague promises of participating in the future privatization of 
Belarusian industry becomes a rational long-term strategy of a Russian elite that values 
geopolitical influence above all else and does not have other actors in Belarus to commit 
to. The regime of Belarusian ruler is aware of this, and exploits Russian position to his 
advantage. Another explanation for the apparent inability to share sovereignty for the 
sake of political integration is that both states are controlled by very narrow winning 
coalitions with few constraints. We know from the work of North and Weingast (1989) 
that unconstrained rulers cannot credibly commit. Political integration between these two 
states undoubtedly requires rulers to commit for a long-term cooperation. Short of a full 
and irrevocable integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation, any other form of 
integration can hardly prevent one or another ruler from reneging on his pledges to 
another. Belarusian ruler, as the head of a smaller and weaker state, is in a more 
vulnerable position, as increasing “real” integration with Russia would almost inevitably 
signal the loss of his authority. While Belarusian regime has been rather authoritarian 
ever since Alexander Lukashenko came into power, Russia has also become increasingly 
authoritarian in 2000s. Integration between countries requires trust and credible 
commitments, something that only democratic regime with a well-functioning system of 
civil society oversight over the state is able to provide. Yoram Barzel wrote about 
impossibility of coalitions between dictators, as the latter cannot commit and relinquish 
any form of authority that is necessary for political integration (Barzel 2002). Belarusian-
Russian integration provides a splendid example of such “integration”.  
 
Last but not the least, however, is the possibility that this uncertain and hence open-ended 
integration with Belarus could present for the Russian ruler for his political purposes in 
the future. While it is more likely than not that the current Russian President intends to 
depart from the political scene in 2008 as it is stipulated by Constitution, and almost 
certain that the figure of Belarusian ruler would not play any prominent role in the 
succession game in 2008 due to the unreliability of the latter, this very open-ended and 
iterative nature of Belarusian-Russian integration introduces an additional degree of 
uncertainty over possible strategies of political survival for the Russian ruler. In the 
words of Borodin, an integrationist official who made a career greasing the wheels of 
Belarusian-Russian integration and a series of treaties and acts thereof, the words could 
be considered as the trial balloon from the Kremlin or the private opinion of the official, 
the Union State between these two countries should have an institution of strong 
presidency. “Recently the pollster ROMIR found that 44 per cent in the sample supported 
the collegial head of [Union} State, 52 per cent supported the institution of presidency 
and vice-presidency, 4 per cent preferred monarchy. Therefore, if majority of the citizens 
support the institution of presidency, so why not Putin? I am confident that his candidacy 
will be approved” (Panfilova 2005). 
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Note: Transformed scores with 95 per cent confidence intervals, and Belarusian and Russian Constitutions 
as reference texts 
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